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Introduction

Although now largely remembered as a philosopher, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (16461716) gave himself the life goal of finding an answer to the entire spectrum of European moral,
sectarian and political issues of his time. Leibniz truly feared for his beloved Europe’s future as
well as its present. In his political memorandum of 1670, he summarized the challenges of his
times as follows:
“These consist in a badly established trade and manufacture; in an entirely debased
currency; in the uncertainty of law and in the delay of all legal actions; in the worthless
education and premature travels of our youth; in an increase of atheism ; in our morals,
which are as it were infected by a foreign plague; in the bitter strife of religions; all of
which taken together may indeed slowly weaken us and, if we do not oppose it in good
time, may in the end completely ruin us; yet we hope, will not bring us down all at
once..”1
Religious war in particular was Leibniz’ great fear. Leibniz was born towards the end of the
Thirty-Years War (1618-1648) and he saw the religious antagonisms arising from the
Reformation as the greatest threat to Europe and, particularly, his own divided region of the Holy
Roman Empire. He fixated on solving this great issue, and his solution was ultimately as bold as
the problem.
Although Leibniz is usually considered a largely secular thinker, in the eighteenth
century he proposed a plan for the nothing less than the mass conversion of China to
Christianity. Rather than being primarily based on the expansion of Christianity, however, his
goal was, this essay will argue, intended as a model for a modern reformation of the religion and
morality crisis of Christian Europe. Following the basic tenets of his philosophy, he held that the
merger of the vast systems of Chinese ancient natural theology and European culture would
Gottfreid W. Leibniz, Paul Ritter,ed., “Securitas Publica,”Gottfied Wilhelm Leibniz: Samtliche Schriften
und Briefe, herausgegeben von der Preusischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 4th series, vol. 1, 133. As
cited in Rudolf W. Meyer, Leibnitz and the Seventeenth-century Revolution (Cambridge, Eng.: Bowes &
Bowes, 1952.) 8.
1
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create a new form of Christianity and society that could in Europe overcome humanity’s modern
corrupt factional theology, and in China establish a centralized monotheistic religion After
learning about a group of Jesuits’, which will later be distinguished as accommodationists,
attempts at fighting for Chinese doctrines and their rights to be accepted into Europe as
theologically and philosophically sound materials, Leibniz decided that he could use some
elements of Chinese natural theology to reform Christianity and restore the glory of God.
Through merging the two great powers and creating a superstructure connecting the two he
believed that his plan could provide the parts of the world he cared to save peace, clarity,
equality and faith.
It is in large part because of this project that Leibniz was so at odds with the
insularism of other enlightenment figures. “Leibniz emerges as the only significant
philosopher of his period(with the exception of Montaigne),” writes Ian Almond in a
characteristic summary, “to actively research the languages, religious texts, and ethnographies
of other cultures.”2 We misunderstand Leibniz, however, if we think he did this solely as a
disinterested intellectual project. His goal was rather the political and religious reform of
Europe, which was to be initiated by the conversion and consequent reform of China. Only as
a consequence of this project did Leibniz embark on his admirable project of cultural
translation between the two world regions. Leibniz made an exemplary effort to search high
and low for key cultural motifs that incorporate ethically sound and just elements in order for
their prosperity in a new system, and not just their survival as scholarship.
However, most importantly, he did indeed do all of this with an open mind: he was
ready and eager to learn about the foreign, not solely for the purposes of comparing them to
Ian Almond. “Leibniz, Historicism, and the "Plague of Islam," in Eighteenth-Century Studies 39.4
(2006): 465.
2
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European equivalents or less, but to understand how they work in their respective societies.
This was not a product of simple good will. At its foundation, Leibniz’s wider philosophy
entailed both a respect for all forms of human thought and perspective that valued other
cultures precisely in their differences. Essentially, to put it in the terms of the field of
computer science which Leibniz is described as founding, different societies represented for
him different programs or systems for understanding the world, and only by understanding all
of their interlocking parts in themselves – every aspect of material culture as well as religion - could they be properly outlined. In combining the two most complex and comprehensive
such systems that God had placed on the earth – that of Europe and China – and creating a
common exchange between them, Leibniz thought he could facilitate nothing less than the
next stage of human history. Even if his grandiose ambitions were not realized, his
philosophical work resonated in the literary and scholarly worlds, as he made sure he was
thorough and fair, in his assessment of foreign cultures and what they offered to this
Renaissance man with a strong scientific background, and a very analytical method of
handling information.
It wasn’t until the publication of the preface to the Novissima Sinica(Latest from
China)[1697] in which he revealed his intentions for Chinese doctrine. My first chapter argues
that Leibniz was genuinely interested in solving Europe’s ethics crisis by using China’s natural
theology, which was only made possible through his faith in his philosophy and his
understanding of Chinese doctrines. He intended to reform Christianity, respecting his Protestant
principles, and to incorporate natural theology into it, in an attempt to restore simpler and
centralized beliefs. For Leibniz, as Patrick Riley notes, the Chinese Emperor was “as just and
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charitable and as a (more or less) "Platonic" geometer who is as wise as he is charitable.”3 From
China, Europe would receive this “geometrical” ethics; for China, Europe would export what
Leibniz took as the rational concept of monotheism as well as traditional European teachings,
reasonings and sciences.
The second chapter argues that Leibniz, through the help of his many correspondents,
found himself growing closer to the Chinese cause, and eventually tried his hardest to redeem the
Confucianism’s theological identity. He thought that the Chinese were quite advanced in social
and philosophical domains, and that Europe had to share its superior military and scientific
knowledge in order to negotiate the details of the great cultural exchange, and rebirth of their
reformed Christianity.
Leibniz ultimately failed his mission in part due to the Chinese Rites controversy, a 17th18th centurty dispute among Catholic missionaries over the compatibility of Confucian traditions
with Christian belief. Despite all of the attempts he made in order to restore theological meaning
he and other accommodationists found in Confucian concepts, mainly its natural philosophies
and concept of * or Li(order of nature), Holy See eventually decided in 1704 and 1715 that the
Chinese rites ought to be banned.
Chapter 3 reveals Leibniz’s true intentions regarding the creation of his reformed, moral,
and culturally advanced Euro-Chinese state, and how he believed that this construct could bring
humanity closer to God, as the possibility of having such a superior civilization could only
highlight God’s magnificence. This of course was heavily inspired by his visions for complex
Monadic structures. He directly applied his philosophical vision to creating the perfect society
which he could use in turn as proof of this philosophy.
Riley, Patrick, “Leibniz's Political and Moral Philosophy in the Novissima Sinica, 1699-1999,” Journal
of the History of Ideas Volume 60, Number 2 (April 1999), 217
3
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Chapter 1
European Ethics and Chinese Natural Theology
China, was regarded as a country that had managed to successfully reign over its
peoples without losing much of its virtues from their ancient doctrines. It wasn’t an openly
religious state like most European territories, China’s Confucianism has been categorized by
some as precursor to Christianity, a sort of Stoicism of forces and society, and by others as an
atheistic philosophical system. China had managed to preserve itself and its ethics in a fashion
that could only be deemed mysterious to a religious outsider. Leibniz, in time would find
himself in a sea of texts provided to him by his many correspondents on Chinese culture and
theology, thus leading him to believe Confucianism had a lot more to offer than any other
belief system in his quest to provide solutions to European ethical problems of the time. He
thought that by converting China to Christianity, a reformed Christianity might arise from the
fusion, with incorporations of natural theological concepts found in ancient Chinese
doctrines: providing the religion with not only ethical amendments, but also an inclination
towards rational theology, and an escape from sectarian hostility.
But why did he give himself this task of solving this so called problem in the first
place? Or better yet, why was Leibniz even in the business of solving problems to begin with?
In this chapter, we’ll look at the European origins of Leibniz’ fascination with China, starting
with the basis of his valuing unbounded curiosity, which developed from both his
biographical circumstances and, increasingly, his philosophy as whole. We’ll then turn to his
belief in the role of education and professionalization in society as a whole, where the notion
of a change of ideas – an Enlightenment – could form the basis of ethics in society. Here
Leibniz saw the Chinese virtues of Confucianism as serving as a model for this pedagogical
project, and also saw a means of disseminating the results of this cultural dialog. Finally,
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we’ll look at one particular discovery that emblematized Leibniz’s belief in the value of this
cultural transmission: Leibniz’s discovery of the I Ching, and with it the basis of a binary
system for underlying and system of information – or society. Within the more complex forest
of the I Ching, Leibniz would also find a model for how two different societies could rest on
different, but related, algorithms.
In a letter to Duke John Frederick of Hanover in 1672, Leibniz wrote: “Mainly because
my parents died so early and I was thus left, almost without any direction, to my studies, I have
had the good fortune to come upon books of many languages, religions and sciences, yet in no
proper order; and these I read, being at first impelled by the instinct of delectatio4.”5 As he put it,
he found delight in learning more and more of other’s perceptions of almost any matter. The
fascination he had with reaching new recorded thought was reflected in his approach to writing,
as I will explain further on, Leibniz approached the subjects of his writings as if it were a puzzle.
At times, they were completely unsolvable like age old philosophical questions regarding man’s
freedom or God’s omniscience for example, but it is obvious to any reader that Leibniz didn’t
write to hover or lightly ponder, but to solve.
In order to establish Leibniz, as a genius of a remarkable background, I will attempt to
summarize his life before approaching his famous grand cultural exchange, as it provides context
to my argument underlining his philosophical maturity as his foundation in problem solving.
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz was born in Leipzig, Electorate of Saxony, 1646, to a Professor of
Moral Philosophy and Registrar of the University of Leipzig. Leibniz’s father, Friedrich, died
when little Gottfried was just six years old. His education was overseen by his mother, the
daughter of a professor of law, and a loyal orthodox Protestant. As a self-proclaimed autodidact,
4

Latin for delight, pleasure.
C. J. Gerhardt, trans., Die Philosophieschen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (Berlin, 18751890), vol. 1, 57. (As cited in Meyer 87)
5
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he was able to enter his father’s library at age seven or eight. Thus started his reading of any
material he could find and teach himself to read, in more languages than one. His interests got
increasingly specific as his level of education augmented: “I began to read historians almost as
soon as I was able to read at all, but as soon as I began to learn logic, I was greatly excited by the
division and order of thoughts I perceived in it. I immediately noticed, to the extent that a boy of
13 could, that there must be a great deal in it.”6 Leibniz did not waste much time; enrolling
himself in to Leipzig University at the young age of 14 he received a doctorate of Law from
University of Altdorf (he was supposed to receive one from Leipzig University a year earlier but
the school decided that a twenty year old was far too young to receive such a diploma).7
After his university years, Leibniz started publishing political and jurisprudential
commentaries and essays under various pseudonyms, a notion which highlights his eagerness to
argue and make a difference, not in the hopes of making a name for himself, but to actually
produce constructive materials. He was given various diplomatic missions, one being a secret
trip to France, in 1672, which entailed him tricking Louis XIV into invading Egypt and its
infidels, driving them away from attacking lands Germans had claimed as their own, Leibniz
intended for this plan to be viewed as a crusade, and an end of inter-Christian hostility.8 The plan
was abandoned almost immediately, but Leibniz managed to get his patron to allow him to stay
in Paris for a few extra months.9 He eventually returned to Germany as counselor to Duke
Johann Friedrich of Brunswick, and settled. The court itself was to experience a meteoric rise
during, but not necessarily because of, Leibniz’ association with it: In 1692, the Duke of

Gerhardt, Vol. 7, 516. As cited in Roger Ariew, “G. W. Leibniz, Life and Works.” In The Cambridge
Companion to Leibniz. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995,) 18.
7
Ariew, “G. W. Leibniz, Life and Work,” 20-27.
8
Steven Nadler, The Best of All Possible Worlds: a Story of Philosophers, God, and Evil (New York:
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008), 13.
6

9

Ibid.
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Brunswick became a hereditary Elector of the Holy Roman Empire, thus arguably one of the
seven most powerful people in central Europe. The British Act of Settlement 1701 designated the
Electress Sophia, the wife of Johann Friedrich’s brother, and her descent as the royal family
England, a role they still of course hold.10 In his lifetime, Leibniz, held many titles from mining
engineer to diplomat, advisor to historian and head librarian, He was quite passionate about what
he found justifiably necessary and important.
His interest in Chinese theology, throughout its history, was also a testament to his
problem seeking and solving character. He found himself in the middle of a grand debate, when
one of his correspondents asked for his opinion on the Chinese Rites debate, and whether he
supported Matteo Ricci(1552-1610), one of the first Jesuit missionaries to traveled the land with
hopes of conversion and rewarding cultural exchange, or Father Longobardi(1559-1654), a Jesuit
who later took Ricci’s post and along with some colleagues decided that, in short, ancient
Chinese doctrines shouldn’t be associated with religion, as they were inherently atheistic.
Ricci argued that Chinese rituals didn’t conflict with Christian values, but Longobardi
pointed out core differences between the two belief systems, adding the fact that the then modern
Chinese widespread atheism was problematic, at the very least. Leibniz rolled up his sleeves and
read more on the subject, and finally concluded that the ancient Chinese doctrine qualified as a
theology, a point which, for him, further discredited the then atheistic doctrines.11 Leibniz,
lobbied for the reconsideration of Chinese people as perfectly eligible for missionary missions
for one last time in 1716, and died shortly after on the same year’s November 14th.

10

Look, Brandon C., "Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring
2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/leibniz/>.
11
Ariew,“G. W. Leibniz, Life and Works,” 37.
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Gottfried Leibniz achieved the privilege to be known as a well-read man at a very
young age. He found solace in reading whatever he could find that peaked his interests first in
his father’s library, and then at school. He was accepted to his father’s former employer, the
University of Leipzig, as a fourteen year old adolescent. Rudolf W. Meyer, a Swiss
philosopher, found Leibniz’s childhood to be quite interesting, as most should given the
unusual intelligence the future scientist showed in his appetite for knowledge and solving
puzzles. It must be said that his surprising independence and attitude towards information he
would encounter from libraries and authoritative doctrine, as remarked by Meyer is nothing
shy of impressive12. Yet, the more one reads into Leibniz’s life, the less surprising his
worldliness gets, as we become conditioned to expect deeper thought and incredible internal
and external associations between both the material and immaterial.
The key to understanding Leibniz’s way of thinking rests on his childhood. Leibniz’s
earliest recorded thoughts were on a rigid system of categories, focusing on criticising dogmatic
tradition. Little Leibniz’s passion for looking to answer his own questions arose from the lack of
information and academic stimulation provided by his school. The future scientist, philosopher
and historian was conditioned to read and read, in order to find answers: “[t]he boys world was a
world of books[,] [l]ater on it was to be also a world of letters; yet his enormous European
correspondence too was ultimately dependent upon the world of books.”13 Leibniz’s professors
and peers witnessed his vast knowledge base and his ability to effortlessly differentiate more
sustainable and reliable information from the rest that was being passed down to him at school,
resulting in his inclination to seek sources outside of his schools.14 Leibniz consciously or

12

Rudolf W. Meyer, Leibnitz and the Seventeenth-century Revolution (Cambridge, Eng.: Bowes &
Bowes, 1952.) 86.
13
Meyer, Leibnitz and the Seventeenth-century Revolution, 86.
14
Meyer, Leibnitz and the Seventeenth-century Revolution, 86-87.
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subconsciously elevated his critical reading and writing skills, in a most impressive manner,
especially considering how he was able to separate dogma from more independent thought. This
could very well be considered the beginning of his passion for problem solving. It is more than
evident to me, that this great thinker was more than capable to assess pieces of information,
theories, reasonings, truths and apply refurbished and reconceptualized ideas in the domains he
felt most appropriate, especially when it comes to Europe’s then contemporary and future legacy.
Whether or not he consciously changed his opinions, or contradicted his previous stances
completely over the course of his lifetime is debatable. Yet, his intentions were not oriented
towards gaining fame or much fortune: for he desired to further expand on subjects that had to be
discussed thoroughly, and for the good of the public. A public, which grew and shifted quite like
him and his views over the years. Self-contradiction, a theme that is witnessed time and again in
his essays, should be considered a sign of intelligence: we learn new ideas, reasonings and truths
from every experience, which is why it is not possible to continuously interpret an event or state
the same way on each re-encounter or re-experience. Leibniz’s tendencies to change his opinions
and reasonings, ideas that he considered most valid but perhaps not true due to the nature of the
claim and its reliance on tangent subjects’ validities, made him what he is considered today: a
renaissance man, unafraid of making his many opinions public.
In 1697, Leibniz published a book titled Novissima Sinica(News from China), with the
subtle purpose of increasing the support of Christian missions in China. Leibniz’s goal in writing
this preface was in hope of persuading Peter the Great of Russia to help with the travel that was
required of Jesuits that were eager to commute to China, his goal was for the tsar to allow the
missionaries to pass through Russia as they found the traditional sea rout to be rather long and
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hazardous.15 Leibniz was a Protestant who supported Catholic missionaries in China, and he
showed his support through the book once more in his praising of the Chinese ruler of the time,
making his views on and intentions for China abundantly clear. At this point in the bottom of the
seventeenth century, Leibniz’s interest in learning more about Chinese culture through his Jesuit
correspondents which will be further discussed in chapter 2, laid the groundwork for his mass
conversion idea. By shedding light on Chinese culture and theology thanks to his rather objective
assessments and clear endorsement of Chinese morality, it was only a matter of time before he
himself made the connections. Now that the answer was made accessible to the public, it was
time for the right questions to be introduced. But before that, let’s take another look at his
background in practical thinking as well as his passion for problem solving.
What makes this great man so interesting and likeable is summarized here: “[t]o him the
aim of reflection was not the creation of a closed system, nor the formulation of a doctrine, but
the critical elucidation of a complex concrete situation.”16 . He wouldn’t have been worried that
today he isn’t regarded as a professional philosopher, as if such a title could encapsulate what a
philosopher truly does. However, Leibniz was never what he was after. He quite plainly enjoyed
to solve problems, mysteries, high density situations, and puzzles of any sort. It had been that
way since the very beginning of his school years. And his attitude towards foreign concepts
thereby was always welcoming, for it made it easier for him to envision them to be utilized in
some way or another, to place them in fitting Eurocentric settings in order to understand them.
Leibniz was not a shy man, he wasn’t afraid to call unjustifiable dogma ‘vulgar
prejudices’, he criticized, at a great extent, what he called superficial and empty thinking brought

15

John Albert White, and Donald F. Lach. "The Preface to Leibniz' Novissima Sinica." Philosophy East

and West 7, no. 3/4 (1957): 154.
16

Meyer, Leibnitz and the Seventeenth-century Revolution, 101
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on by libertins and Cartesians and their school syllabi.17 Leibniz had autonomy in what he read
and felt he must learn, in an autobiographical note he made it clear that he was to learn all there
was to be offered in the realm of the sciences, and reach all of its principles, to him this was key
in working everything else out.18 This highlights his identity as a man of science and a thinker
who must rely on scientific principles, in his method of thinking. Education was a very important
topic for him, especially considering his youth and the lack of proper scholarly, or simply
informative by his standards, materials that he had to eventually search for in others’ libraries.
Weigel, a former professor to young Leibniz, had slightly different educational ideals for
Germany, when Weigel was planning out what he called “Collegium Artis Consultorum”, for
which he had formulated very specific syllabi Leibniz was asked to comment on his work. 19To
my surprise, Leibniz, at no point, shied away from criticising Weigel’s plans, he criticized his
syllabi claiming they focused too much on the artificial and not enough on the natural, he also
criticized the weakness of the proposed name, stating that often times ideas got rejected for their
inadequacy.20 It is important to establish how important Leibniz’s criticism on education really
is, as he was a genius autodidact who went out of the comfort zone of his schools to be able to
access the knowledge he wanted. From a young age, he implicitly shifted his approach to
everything, as he was conditioned to do so by his environment and the lack of resources his
school just could not provide to him during his first stage of intellectual development. He felt
that a change was needed in the education system but that the examples of refined systems were
too impractical, ideal or vague for people to actually start adapting:
“ Many a writer before has remarked on the manner in which in Germany Schools,
Academies, Education, Peregrination, Guilds and the Sciences are all corrupted and
17

Meyer, Leibnitz and the Seventeenth-century Revolution, 87.
Gerhardt, trans., vol. VII, 185. As cited in Meyer, 87.
19
Meyer, Leibnitz and the Seventeenth-century Revolution, 91.
20
G. E. Guhrauer, ed., Leibniz’s Deutsche Schriften. Berlin 1840. Vol. 2, 473. As cited in Meyer, 200.
18
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confounded; there have likewise been many who have made proposals to remedy these
evils; but these proposals are partly too theoretical, being taken ex Republica Platonis et
Altantide Baconis[from Plato’s Republic and Bacon’s Atlantis]; partly quite
incomprehensible, that is Lullian or Metaphysical; and partly ambiguous and dangerous
to the Republic.”21
His writings on education should be taken quite seriously as it is testament to the open minded
and optimistic characteristics, he was a person that made efforts for the good of his public, first
his fatherland and then Europe. His views on education are important as he was deeply
unsatisfied by the way his schools couldn’t really teach him what he was so eager to find and
learn for himself in his father’s library. This man could not have arguably become one of the
fathers of calculus if his family did not have an abundance of books available at home. Therefore
there is genuine concern placed here, in his words, for this is a very personal subject for him, and
so observing what he fought for deepens our understanding of this great man, altogether.

What Leibniz had envisioned for his public was a specialized professional middle class,
influenced by a predominantly scientific class, this is based off of a plan he shared with a
Joachim Becher on education as a tool for political power, by having a central and national
educational authority and eventually to be able to control the production of classes: “Leibniz’s
many designs for learned societies and academies were drawn up very much on these lines; and
both men were impressed by the success of political education in contemporary France.”22 Many
thinkers were trying to figure out the most efficient way to produce a more learned and
enlightened society, and the fact that the competitive atmosphere that Europe had been
cultivating over the course of its existence was nothing but a great advantage and a powerful
motivator for these commentators.

21

Gottfried Leibniz, Bedenken von Aufrichtung einer Akademie oder Societät in Deutschland zum
Aufnehmen der Künste und Wissenschaften, (1671,) Vol. 1, §13, 546.As cited in Meyer, 92.
22

Meyer, Leibnitz and the Seventeenth-century Revolution, 91.
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In 1671, Leibniz published a Memorandum titled On the Founding of a learned Society
in Germany, in which he contemplated on practical knowledge and further expanded his vision
for education, in a broader context:
“All the education[] should tend towards a true, that is ‘practical’, knowledge of God. To
attain to this knowledge, three kinds of men are necessary: first, a class of ‘orators’ and
‘priests’, who will disseminate it in the world; secondly, a class of ‘philosophers’, whose
task is to elucidate and exhibit harmony of all God-made things; and thirdly, the most
perfect class of ‘moralists, politicians and statesmen’, who being the tools of God,
increase perfection of this world, but have to rely for their support upon the two lower
classes.”23
Leibniz adds religion into the mix, stating that somehow practical knowledge of God should be
essential, in order for the system to function properly. In short, what he expected from these men
were faith, harmony and guidance, all of which rested on the assumption that these were all men
of admirable ethics. Leibniz’s line between material and immaterial isn’t often clear, yet here he
relies on practical knowledge being the force that must drive societies to higher degrees of
perfection. His faith in man is projected, as he trusts that others’ faith in God and the vision of
perfection that one experiences in his or her faith would work as their prime motivation in their
efforts to create a better education system, reliant on practical knowledge.
However, in order to even dream about reforming publicly accessible academia, Leibniz
needed to solve an even greater threat to his beloved societies: unethical behavior. He turned to
China after realizing the completely different social dynamics in their societies, and became
fascinated with their codes of social conduct. In his Novissima Sinica Leibniz’s praise and
demand for Chinese moral practices to be incorporated into European ethics is largely credited to
their social interactions with one another:
“But it is desirable that they in turn teach us those things which are especially in our
interest: the greatest use of practical philosophy and a more perfect manner of living, to
23

Meyer, Leibnitz and the Seventeenth-century Revolution, 95.
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say nothing now of their arts. Certainly the condition of our affairs, slipping as we are
into ever greater corruption, seems to be such that we need missionaries from the Chinese
who might teach us the use of practice of natural religion”24
The Chinese virtues of peer tolerance and respect between peasants and servants as Leibniz’s
goal for European societies and the mending of all Christian’s hostility towards each other. Thus
merging his clairvoyance and practical thinking into one problem solving expedition, in which he
desired but one thing: mending Europe. He might not have cared too much for China or their
social traditions and interactions, or the Muslim Ottoman threat that had been lingering around
Europe’s Eastern front for far too long, but rather their impact on Europe’s future. Leibniz was
not a naive thinker, he was always set out on a mission, and I will argue that at times, his
intentions weren’t as clear as his arguments would suggest.
Leibniz cannot be named an opportunistic writer, this would be terribly naive mainly due
to the lack of harboring overwhelmingly selfish, self-promoting or self-rewarding demands and
personal gain as an outcome to any political or philosophical commentary he has ever made. He
never owned a business that he tried to promote. He was passionate about the Holy Roman
Empire and restoring his glory, yet he didn’t fixate on his enemies; he accepted most Christian
people, especially Catholics.
“In 1670, Leibniz, aged twenty-four, published his first philosophical work. Marius
Nizolius of Bersello(in the state of Modena) had published a treatise, De veris principiis,
et vera ratione philosophandi contra pseudophilosophos (On true principles, and the true
method of philosophizing against the false philosophers) in 1553. Nizolius’ ‘false
philosophers’ were all Scholastics, past and present.[...]By the seventeenth century the
book had fallen into oblivion[, until] Leibniz published it with a preface and some notes
and used the occasion to show off his general erudition and knowledge of philosophy.”25

Gottfried Leibniz, “Preface to the Novissima Sinica”, 1697-1699. As published in Daniel J. Cook,
Henry Rosemont Jr., Writings on China. (Chicago and La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1994.) 51.
25
Ariew,“G. W. Leibniz, Life and Works, 22.
24
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Nizolius’ book aimed to take a jab at what he considered as corrupted philosophy, he thought
that terms that couldn’t be rerendered in simpler terms were no longer relevant, he attacked the
Scholastics on the grounds of their ideas being obscene and language being barbaric26. Leibniz
used Nizolius’ work to prove, once and for all, that he had sufficient knowledge and technical
ability to analytically criticize, as well as present his own natural philosophy for the first time, at
an official capacity. Yet, he didn’t shame Nizolius, instead he made remarks on the work in order
to correct his thinking and not just scrap it all. Nizolius used nominalism to persuade his readers
into thinking that the Scholastics’ views were tainted, Leibniz took this opportunity to “expound
upon the nature of universals and the general rule, ‘entities must not be multiplied without
necessity’”27, and that is simply it. This pre-work of Leibniz beautifully summarizes the kind of
thinker he truly was: he was not a person sailing across books’ and pamphlets’ pages, hoping to
find some ideas to clash with, he was a hands-on philosopher in constant search of improving
knowledge as a whole, unafraid of formulating an opinion on what he felt he was informed
about.
The preface turned out to be quite beneficial for Leibniz, shortly after his republication of
Nizolius, he was able to produce his first work in natural philosophy, and followed this with a
more practical and dangerous attempt at changing the world, as he knew it. After the Thirty
Years War, Leibniz “came up with various schemes to weaken French power by weakening its
economy”28, he went so far as to publish a satire on the Sun King, and later tour the country in
hopes of illuminating himself and others. This early work of his would later be captioned as
destructive as he his future mission would be to unify Europe, especially in religion and ethics.
His patriotism did get the best of him, as rivalry between France and the Holy Roman Empire
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had been at an all time high and Leibniz desired only to lift up his fellow Germans spirits after a
great loss. This political passion and force that influenced him to leave his country and to
actually try to solve the Holy Roman Empire’s mortal enemy is another testament to how much
he cared for his country. He could have easily stayed at home, and published manifestos,
pamphlets and essays on how France and Navarre deserved nothing less than the absolute worst,
but he didn’t.
After returning from traveling Western Europe for some time, Leibniz returned to his
fatherland,Hanover, where he settled and served a few Hanover princes, and by doing so became
increasingly political. Leibniz encountered a very interesting political situation caused by Martin
Luther and his secularization of Principalities.29 With this movement, Luther’s Princes obtained
absolute sovereignty of state and religion, which granted them the power to focus their preferred
form of Christian to whatever they desired. This allowed religious sect rivalries to become an
even bigger issue, all the while burning reformed bridges that Luther worked so hard to build in
the first place. This actuality that Leibniz experienced, first hand and not through a book, is
perhaps what prompted Leibniz to start harvesting thoughts that would later conclude him to
believe that all of Europe’s Christianity should merge and finally formulate a Christian EuroChinese superstructure in order to hit many unsuspecting birds with one stone. However, his first
publications on solving all of these matters, on a much larger scale, weren’t published until the
last fifteen years of his life. These ideas might have been brewing inside Leibniz’s mind palace,
but they hadn’t yet reached paper until he was exposed to even more contemporary Christian
problems and puzzles, later provided to him through Jesuit missionaries.
Martin Luther had made possible for German Princes to become increasingly
independent, especially in terms of religion. Luther argued that spiritual and secular or temporal
29
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authorities must not cross over, God's spiritual authority may be supreme, but it can't extend on
to worldly governmental functions. For Luther, every individual was a subject of the realm of
God and his or her ruler's state, and that these allegiances are different , and that secularism must
be upheld.30 Leibniz’s crusade entailed ending domestic Christian rival hostility as well as
general ethical crises, he aimed to heal all by reforming it completely. He would eventually
argue that this could easily be achieved through reverting to a simpler natural theology’s input on
to the contemporary Christians sects by using Ancient Chinese theology. A clever attempt at
reigniting the flame of decent human beingness the Holy Bible so openly advocates for by
bringing in Ancients, this plan had worked once in Europe by revisiting in the Greek Classics
through the phenomenon of quick and easy printing technology. Why couldn’t a similar plan
work again?
Leibniz was a Protestant first, and a Christian second. Reformation was in his blood, and
thereby most of his solutions contained mending, editing and reformulation. Christian traditions
had the ever present problem of not appealing to its evolving audience’s needs, and Leibniz,
being the Protestant he was, was keen on mending the traditions, instead of discarding the issue
completely.Traditionalists and non-traditionalists have been tirelessly clashing since little old
Eve was just a rib of Adam’s. Luckily for Europe, at one point Leibniz had tried to solve
Christian tradition problems as well: “Leibniz hoped to solve the crisis of the Christian tradition
by subordinating pietist to rational religiousness: …’on ne sauroit aimer Dieu, sans en
connoistre les perfections, et cette connaissance renferme les principes de la veritable
piete[we/one can not love God without recognizing [his] perfections, and this knowledge
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contains the principles of true piety].’”31 The central issue that arose on many separate occasions
had to do with the validity of the Christian tradition, especially with the “scientific revolution of
the age, with its new accounts of the Self and the world, [giving] an added weight of
responsibility to his particular philosophical solution of the problem.”32 At the end of the day,
religion was there for people to seek refuge and guidance in. The fact that people were taking
advantage of religion by making arguments that relied on holy passages dragged out of context
was not a phenomenon a rationalist would get behind. Leibniz, on occasion, was a man of
modest desires, and undoubtedly the most important of which was the solidarity of his Christian
brothers, as he genuinely wanted people to be happy and for he believed that it was possible
through God and his own help to achieve a just and peaceful society: “[i]t is to be ensured that
men are prudent, endowed with virtue, abundant in faculties, evidently so that they know, will
and are able to act in the best way” in order to achieve public happiness.33
The only time, according to Leibniz, in which a Christian would be permitted to release
himself from the moral clauses that restrict hostility towards others could only be against what he
categorized as the plague of Islam: “[i]t is difficult to make the world believe that black is white,
that in order to affirm public peace one has to take up arms which destroy it, and for that good of
Christianity has to break all the sacred bonds of Christianity” 34 and even then his strong
opposition to Islam and Muslims can be regarded as a tool that could bring people together in the
hopes of defeating a common enemy together, as a unit.
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The Cartesian revolution brought a new dimension to many discussions including man’s
place in nature and whether or not God was being eclipsed or replaced through the further
development of tools, and technology:“If man is the centre of the revealed world, then his duty to
fashion the world according to his own designs becomes obvious and indisputable.”35 Leibniz
was not so keen on eliminating God from any discussion, and this particular self-inflation of the
image of man didn’t sit right with him:
“But in this manner he advanced in fact the very argument that renders the Christian faith
unreal. For to a Christian the limits of man are drawn not by ‘the majesty of Nature’, but
by God; it is in God that the Christian knows his foundations to lie, and in Him is man’s
autonomy suspended. These limits of man the new mathematical thought was prepared to
accept. But it interpreted them as drawn not by a divine, but by an anonymous power.”36
Nature was just not allowed to be perceived as divine any more. Leibniz tried to protect and
preserve Christian Cosmology in his essay “Systeme Nouveau de la Nature” but failed, as
bringing the words “la majeste de la nature” no longer sufficed. As the natural world around us
became more and more approachable through science and technology, Leibniz’s religion started
taking blows to the gut.
In view of all of this tension, Leibniz attempted to take a few steps back and reintroduce
God through the perspective of a Christian rationalist in his chef d’oeuvre the Monadology: “God
alone is the primary Unity, or original simple substance, from which all monads, created and
derived, are … born so to speak, by continuous fulgurations of the the Divinity…”37. The term
he paraphrased as “original simple substance” is a very innovative thought, especially for a
scientist who holds reason and rationalism above all. The sheer vagueness leaking out of every
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cranny and crevasse doesn’t seem to stop Leibniz from believing in something that he could not
sense or measure with any of his physical senses, which is as contradictory as it gets.
Meyer captioned him as a Christian philosopher, a move not every Leibniz reader would
do, as many have argued in favor of him being agnostic or atheistic, and not particularly religious
even in his cultural identity. People have quoted his Sufficient Reason Principle, an argument
which supports the questioning of even the simplest facts, and demands validation of all that is
expected to be considered factual. Leibniz, as a rationalist, relied on reason and explanations. His
prime argument had always been conditional to being able to comprehend or rationalize all, even
if it meant that the matter at hand needed time and future technology required for its inevitable
unveiling of its cause for creation or come to being out of its necessity. His Principles of
Contradiction(which dictates that “a proposition cannot be true and false at the same time, and
that therefore A is A and cannot be not A.”38) and Sufficient Reason does rely on a God, a creator
that exists based off of its necessity in order for all to be defined within reason. Whether or not
Leibniz used the word God in parallel with the world’s major religions is not very clear, and is
still debated today. Interestingly both monotheistic religious people and atheists use his
principals in arguments for and against, respectively, proof of the existence of a God. This comes
to show how Leibniz’s arguments were open to many different and at times polar interpretations.
It also underlines the inherent vagueness he leaves in his essays and books, which could arguable
show signs of censorship of his time, especially when it came to religious discussion topics.
Leibniz’s contingency argument is another important one, in which he claims that the
reason a God-like essence created the actual world is due to it being the best possible world there
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could be: “[t]he reason for this world is that it is the best[,] [t]he reason for any contingent truth
is that, since the existence of the actual world entails it, it is for the best.”39 For a rationalist,
there is no doubt that it is an extremely vague claim, but it sufficed for the time being, as I will
further argue that he wasn’t truly in the business on solving theological problems per se, but
rather intended for people to simply correct themselves. Leibniz wanted people to achieve public
happiness for he believed it would reflect divine power and its perfections as his goals for
humanity could only be achieved through God’s blessings(e.g., life, will, knowledge), which will
be discussed in chapter 3.
The simplest and uncontested thought Leibniz did possess was that he really did want
peace amongst his fellow European men: “[w]hatever is publicly useful, is to be done[,] [t]he
common good is valued by the goods of all being collected into one total.”40 Leibniz believed in
creating higher structures, dependent on other independent structures, as mentioned in his
Monadology, thereby his views on achieving public happiness must be incorporated into the
foundations of his natural philosophy: “[g]ood is a necessity without which we are miserable, the
rest are only called useful... [m]oreover, [people] will not think vicious thoughts, nor will them,
nor be able to put them into practice.”41 He wanted his subjects to be good citizens, respectful of
one another, loving and kind, exemplary to what Jesus would have wanted them to behave. This
is what Leibniz was truly after, he could quite arguably have cared less about foreign culture if
he didn’t believe in his mission: salvaging European morals, at any cost. Even if it meant that he
would have to turn towards other cultures to look for answers. I am not suggesting that he was
39
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Tome 2 Tome 2 (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1998), 613.
41

Gura, Textes inédits d'après les manuscrits de la Bibliothèque provinciale de Hanovre, 613.

23

disinterested in globalism or that he wasn’t objectively interested in any culture he could learn
from, but the bottom line for him was maintaining Europe’s legacy as well as its supremacy.
Perkins argued that: “[t]he fact that cultural exchange is important primarily as a way to gain
experiential truths and observations fuels Leibniz’s enthusiasm for China.”42 is very true, but
incomplete. It was important in the context of rebuilding Europe. Perhaps if Christian Europeans
weren’t so busy being hostile to one another, Leibniz would not have praised the Chinese ruler as
openly as he did in his Novissima Sinica. Yet that wasn’t the case at all, visibly speaking, he was
incredibly open-minded, for his time. And he did indeed praise another continent’s ruler, which
was a very tricky move, especially for someone under the patronage of a German prince.
The most recognizable display of Leibniz’ cultural tolerance and desire for creating a
mutually beneficial environment in which both communities could merge and give birth to a
reformed super-culture can be found here: “we need the Chinese to send us Missionaries in
turn, for us to learn the natural religion that we have almost lost.”43 His open call for a cultural
ambassadorship promotes a very modern concept, one that wasn’t likely to circulate until very
recently, as immigration and cultural tolerance laws, in Europe, didn’t relax until well after
Leibniz’s era.
When Leibniz eventually got his hands on more Chinese materials, thanks to the Jesuit
missionaries, he found interest in one specific book titled I Ching, which can be translated as the
Book of Changes. After a French Jesuit missionary, Joachim Bouvet, who was convinced that he
saw a binary arithmetic in some of the diagrams he shared with Leibniz, the German thinker
decided to write an essay about it and send it to the Academy of Sciences, in Paris, two years
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after his exposure to this previously hidden arithmetic.44 The oldest edition of I Ching dates
back five millennia, and is still referred to as it is considered more simple and natural in its
knowledge. Leibniz used the book in the creation of his new binary arithmetic that we still
depend on quite heavily every day, as it makes up our computer processing instructions, used by
most of the electronic devices around us. Interestingly, Perkins mentioned Leibniz’s noted
disbelief of coming across any potential scientific revelation in Chinese ancient doctrine:
“[w]hile Leibniz is anxious to learn many things from China, he generally does not expect to
learn truths in such fields as mathematics or metaphysics.”45 The truth is that he eventually did
learn more by reverting to much older texts, which perhaps sealed the envelope belonging to his
Chinese-European conversion mission statement. After all, this ancient doctrine had given him
his famous works on binary, one of which being Explication de l'arithmétique binaire, qui se
sert des seuls caracteres 0 & 1(Explanation of the binary arithmetic which utilizes only the
numbers 0 &1), why couldn’t it give him the solution to Europe’s problems as well? If the I
Ching managed to keep this mathematical secret for so long, what did other ancient Chinse texts
have in store for the Europeans who had the capacity of uncovering more hidden meanings?
Indeed, we could add that just as the I Ching suggested that increasingly complicated
adumbrations of binaries could explain extremely complex fields, so the binary system – as
modern computers demonstrated – could form a foundational language connecting each culture.
In any case, this one insight was so powerful for Leibniz’ thought that it must have suggested the
value of the mutual translation of the two systems.
Leibniz thought that bringing China systemic religion would improve the then modern
Chinese philosophies as a whole, by providing them with the mostly verbal tools that would
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get them out of their Stoic deadlock. According to Cook, the use of the word “ancient”, when
describing the many philosophies of the Chinese people is more than crucial to the whole
operation, as he didn’t credit the then modern thinkers to merit the titles of reasonable
interpreters of the ancient texts (as he remarked in his Discourse on the Natural Theology of
the Chinese). This is an important remark, showing how strictly Leibniz was editing what he
presented in his interpretations and characterizations of Chinese theology. All of this brings us
to an important question on why Leibniz privileged ‘ancient’ information, whether it was
Western, Chinese or Middle Eastern. Did it have to do with a notion of what was written down
by the ancients must have been simple, direct, and thus relatively more original in thought?
Why did he edit out modern thoughts, what made modern thought so tainted, and if the modern
thinkers were so off point, how could the Chinese people be converted given the reasoning that
they would have been influenced by their modern thinkers and interpreters of their ancient
texts?
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Chapter 2
Chinese Rites: heresy or exemplar?

Leibniz’ understanding of China can be traced back to the the Jesuit order’s first
Chinese mission, which commenced with St. Francis Xavier(1506-1566)’s attempt to travel to
China in 1552. Although, his journey ended prematurely with his death, the desire to establish
a Christian outpost was still there, and the fire was finally rekindled in 1582 with Matteo
Ricci, when he successfully settled and established an outpost in mainland China, in which
Jesuits could study the Chinese ways and start converting locals. The Jesuits had significant
political influence, particularly when they served as advisors to the rulers who were tolerant
and eager to learn about Western science and philosophy. Using the intelligence first provided
by the Jesuits, Leibniz suggested in his writings on China, spanning from 1699 to 1716, that
there was serious merit to the notion of a transmission and dialogue between the Chinese and
Christian spheres. To understand the merits and flaws of Leibniz’ argument, as well as its
ambitious scope, we need to first situate it in the controversies that developed around Jesuit
missions to China. In particular, in the “Chinese Rites Controversy” Leibniz would strongly
side with those who saw Chinese beliefs as harmonizing with those Christianity, and against
those who considered them antithetical. It was from this base that Leibniz could build the
project of the mutual translation of the two cultures.
Leibniz wrote philosophical texts primarily expanding on notes and critiques
belonging to a Father Longobardi. He was convinced that the priest was being objective, and
not flattering of classical Chinese authors and their works. Longobardi was a Jesuit
missionary who had been stationed in China by his order with the aims of translating and
understanding Chinese doctrines, along with converting the public. Leibniz’s didn’t shy away
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from critiquing Longobardi’s interpretation of certain Chinese doctrines. For example, the
embodiment of angels, Leibniz writes, was not a sign of the denial of an existence of the
spiritual, as Longobardi had argued: many of Europe’s well-respected philosophical
forefathers had made the same presumptuous mistake on the case of the angels. As with many
areas of his interpretation, Leibniz’ own philosophy attempted to make immanent and material
aspect of Christianity that were transcendent. He found in Chinese philosophy a ready set of
parallels. He wasn’t concerned with disallowing foreign concepts and understandings of
prestige, and to grant them high acclamation if and when they were deserving of such a thing:
“there is in China a public morality admirable in certain regards, conjoined to a philosophical
doctrine, or rather a natural theology, venerable by its antiquity, established and authorized for
about 3,000 years, long before the philosophy of the Greeks whose works nevertheless are the
earliest which the rest of the world possess, except of course for our Sacred Writings.”46. Yet
he couldn’t refrain from using some sort of monotheistic reference, even if it meant the
mentioning of the Old Testament, this might be an indication of editorial censoring, or it very
well might have been an original remark, there is no way of knowing.
Accommodating Chinese ideas, not viewing them as completely irrelevant to
Christianity was a view popularized by Ricci, and followed by Leibniz. Leibniz wasn’t alive
when Ricci convinced Europe, for a brief period, that Chinese ancient texts could be
interpreted in certain lights that would make it accessible for Christians to relate to this
entirely foreign and secluded society’s older beliefs. Matteo Ricci was an incredibly important
person for Leibniz, this Italian born Jesuit spent most of his adult life in China, learning from
the locals, the Chinese court, and both their modern and ancient doctrines. If we were to
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remember this man by one idea, it would be his accommodationist view when it came to
understanding and accepting ancient Chinese natural philosophy. Ricci’s successor Father
Longobardi, opposed this idea of trying to hold some Chinese concepts of heaven and a
supreme ancestor, outdating Jesus and his friends, in which Ricci pointed out alleged
similarities between Chinese philosophy with Christian theology. He intended for these
similar terms to work as a bridge between the two immensely different cultures, and the
stories of their origins. Ricci, and in time Leibniz, fought for China’s right to be able to be
considered salvageable, or religiously redeemable, as they believed that cultural differences
shouldn’t act as permanent roadblocks, crippling an entire nation and stopping them from
become Christians.
Ricci, became remarkably comfortable with Chinese culture and language in a relatively
short slice of time. He comprehended the importance of learning about his immediate
community, in which he was given the mission to uncover Chinese practices as well as to
convert as many people as he could. His firm grasp on the language made ideas all the more
accessible to him, it is noted that his Chinese writing skills were virtually indistinguishable
with his contemporary Chinese scholars. His open mindedness and, most importantly, his
willingness to accommodate potentially parallel foreign constructs into Christian traditions of
thinking was what truly attracted Leibniz to his work. Ricci, did not look down upon the
cultures of the settlements he visited, and when in China went as far as to “shave[] [his] head
and beard, shroud[] in the robes of a Buddhist monk” , he stated that the reason why he
changed his entire European look, was because he believed that religious men in China needed
to dress holy, and had to forfeit luxury in many ways. Interestingly, he later understood how
he had been cultivating his image in a wrong way, that the Buddhist monks were lower class,
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and that to gain influence he needed silks. Moreover, Buddhism was in part a heterodox sect,
whereas the Confucianism of the court would allow him greater access. Dressing like the
Chinese literati instead of like a reminder of how “the name of foreigners and priests is
considered so vile in China that we need this and other similar devices to show them that we
are not priests as vile as their own.”47
Ricci, as well as every other missionary at the time witnessed the different actions and
reactions regarding law and its enforcement, and felt as if corrections were to be made
specifically for their target audience: the Chinese public. An example that encapsules this claim
perfectly is Ricci and his colleague Ruggieiri’s translation of “Thou shall not committ adultery”
to “Thou shalt not do depraved, unnatural or filthy things.”48 As vague as the statement was, they
altered this widespread translation for it to be comparatively louder and clearer than the original
one given the different audience. They expected the public to understand and change their ways
regarding their crimes and punishments, with the aid of this more comprehensive translation.
This is a very important example, showing how like minded Leibniz and Ricci were when it
came to cultural appropriation and trying to maintain, what they thought, was universal equality
but was in fact an attempt at elevating quality of life to Eurocentric standards.
Contrary to Ricci and Leibniz’s enthusiasm, Longobardi along with most Dominican
and Franciscan Friars of the time did not adapt Chinese philosophy to Christian theology, as
they believed that making such connections were simply wrong. This debate between these two
sides, battling over whether or not mostly Confucian doctrine was compatible with Christianity
is known as the Rites Controversy. Ricci’s fluid definitions, and willingness to appropriate
Chinese natural philosophy with European monotheistic theology was eventually overlooked,
47
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and overturned. Yet, Leibniz wasn’t convinced that throwing it all away was appropriate, and
he argued in favor of Chinese culture, in order to establish their closeness to European
standards of spirituality. His goal in doing so, was to groom their image as wise and ethical
people that were chiefly misguided due to a lack of centralized religion and European
knowledge: perfect candidates for a conversion.
Leibniz wasn’t intimidated by this vastly different culture: to him the Chinese
civilization was one that would eventually validate humanity’s magnetic attraction to reason
and wisdom. After all, logic had to be in the foundations of all principles, regardless of the
geography of their origins. The true optimist, he was compelled to look at China as a potential
land of radically different but compatible ideas, with philosophies that could aid Christianity
and what it had become. The Chinese conversion to Christianity would trigger a mutually
beneficial reform period, mending the hostility that had been lingering around Europe for far
too long. As a principle commentator on this period this aspect of Leibniz’ work, Franklin
Perkins notes: “While Europe’s moral poverty led it to perpetual conflicts and wars between
religious factions, (in Leibniz’s lifetime) China was peaceful. This led Leibniz to prefer the
natural theology of the Chinese to the corrupted revealed theology of Europe”49.
This potential challenge of cultural translation, as he imagined, would yield a greater
perspective on to God, and to Leibniz that was the most fundamental outcome of the project.
On one hand he was stating that it was a conversion, a task which God expected from all good
Christians, on the other it was a journey that would reverse the sails, and return Christians to
the core of the religion, before it was corrupted by humans. The same humans which were
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capable of impurities due to lack of knowledge and wrongful executions deriving from wrong
thoughts and free will, who could partake in the very same mistakes regardless of their
placement in the physical world, and so he believed in his cause: “And thus, as far as I
understand, I think the substance of the ancient theology of the Chinese is intact and, purged
of additional errors, can be harnessed to the great truths of the Christian religion.”50 This idea
will be revisited in the following chapter.
In order to be able to pave the road to discuss the Chinese conversion, Leibniz found
that he had to first convince Europe of how the Chinese weren’t too far off the path of
religion, and he could only achieve this through Ricci’s accommodationist foundations. His
primary task was to fit Chinese thoughts into his conceptions of Western theology and
philosophy. As he tried to carry out this task, he was quite aware of his process of breaking
down these foreign views and translating them with care. He takes this association between
the two completely different philosophical realms to the next level when he brings in his
Monadaology, which I will comment on after establishing his respect for Chinese doctrine on
a more broad spectrum. Leibniz, in his Remarks on Chinese Rites and Religion:
“What the ancient priests and philosophers of China thought is not easy to determine.
Even with so much illumination from history, criticism and philosophy, we know how
often we argue among ourselves about the meaning of Plato, Aristotle and even
Augustine. Among the Chinese, I believe neither history nor criticism nor philosophy
are sufficiently developed. No one at all has yet emerged who has produced a literary
history of the Chinese and who has attributed the true works, meanings and sense to
each author.”51.
In other words, he had objections to how Chinese thought was being misinterpreted in its own
culture, as there was a certain lack of context. He thought his philosophy could make amends
for this, and provide a broader context for ancient Chinese thought.
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Leibniz tried to bring in examples of Chinese rituals that would work as common
ground, in order to make this foreign culture more approachable and inherently relatable. He
gave an example on the afterlife which one could view as an attempt at connecting between
Christian and Pagan European customs: “one could demonstrate that the literati thought that
the souls of Confucius and the others were conscious of what is happening after death and that
they reward those who imitate and worship them and punish those who scorn them.”52. This
could be used to support his argument claiming the Chinese public to be one of spiritual belief
infusions, allowing them a sort of access to the Christian realm.
What was most important to Leibniz in his Remarks on Chinese Rites and Religion, is
his eagerness to save and preserve Chinese souls, as he continuously tries to bring perspective
to their lack of religion, or specifically, lack of centralized and harmonious religion. In his
view, the basis of such a religion already existed in ancient China, but had been lost by a lack
of systematic criticism and organization:
“I would think that no doubt many philosophers from the Orient, no less than the
Platonists and Stoics, regarded God as the World-soul or as the universal nature
immanent in things; that other spirits also assumed bodies; and that some even
considered the soul as a particle of the divine aura, which would return to the Ocean of
souls with the body's death. I would not deny that this had been the thought of many
Chinese philosophers, but since the philosophy of the Chinese has never been
organized in a systematic form, and, I very much suspect, they lack philosophical
terminology, nothing prevents interpreting what the ancients teach about divine and
spiritual things in a more favorable sense.”53

Leibniz, in the first part of his Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese, pointed out
that he believes that the Chinese have recognized “spiritual substances”, yet the parameters of
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recognize these substances as separated, and existing quite apart from matter. There would be
no harm in that with regard to created Spirits, because I myself am inclined to believe that
Angels have bodies; which has also been the opinion of several ancient Church Fathers. I am
also of the opinion that the rational soul is never entirely stripped of all matter.”54. He then
explained how the Chinese thought God was embodied, and that the only way for them to
understand European Christianity was through their comprehension of how God was an
intelligentia supramundana([notion]beyond understanding), and superior to matter. In order
for Leibniz to be able to further argue the benefits of adding Chinese ethics and philosophies,
as a whole, into European culture, he needed to convince his readers that the Chinese had to be
credited with advanced natural theological theories: “Therefore, in order to determine whether
the Chinese recognize spiritual substances, one should above all consider their Li, or order,
which is the prime mover and ground of all other things, and which I believe corresponds to
our Divinity.”55, and he thus cut the ribbon and began his excavation of li.
Father Longobardi spent a lot of time gathering materials on li, the first principle, “They
call it (par excellence) the Being, the Substance, the Entity. According to them, this substance is
infinite, eternal, uncreated, incorruptible, and without beginning or end” these qualities of li
create a divide between itself and Monads, as Monads cannot ignore time, and require explicit
creation. Leibniz writes (it seems that this Father L but then next sentence makes it seem like
Leibniz):“It is not only the principle of the physical basis of Heaven and Earth and other
material things, but also the principle of the moral basis of virtues, customs, and other spiritual
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things. It is invisible, it is perfect in its being to the highest degree, and it is itself all
perfections.”56
Leibniz expanded on the concept of li two years after he finished his Monadology,
which must be associated to his deeper understanding and the meanings he projected on to li
regardless of what li really was. The Monadology seems to appear highly influential on
Leibniz’s perception of unique, fluid, immaterial building blocks he captioned as Monads. Li,
in other words, was the Chinese inferior product to his rationalist European constructs, and
can only be properly compared to the Stoic’s natural theology, as it is described to be morally
grounded and still trapped in the material world, quite like a Greek God; li should be regarded
as a simple deity or theology that must be improved or converted.
Father Longobardi tried to further disassociate, or quite arguably discredit, this
foreign concept in order to affirm European theology’s superiority and to make sure that
people didn’t mistake li for God: “do not let yourself be dazzled by these specious names
under which a poisonous doctrine is hidden. For if you penetrate to the very heart of the
matter, to its very root, you will see that this Li is nothing other than our prime
Matter57.”.Here he brings in prime matter, a matter which is given the properties of gas,
Longobardi tried to direct people’s attention towards the spiritual and material
understandings of creation and existence, in an arguably aggressive fashion. After all, his
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desire to maintain, if not augment the value of the gospel of the lord was his primary
mission, as he was stationed in China as a Jesuit missionary.
The following sections of Leibniz’s Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese
points out Longobardi’s prejudice; they state that the Sicilian priest had been influenced by
certain Mandarin Atheists, and their views that use the ancient texts in a manipulative way. He
suggests then that Longobardi was reading arguments that were written to promote flaws in
the ancient natural religion: “One should no more trust the obviously strained interpretation of
such people than one would trust those of an Atheist in Europe who would try to demonstrate
by passages pulled out of context, from Solomon and other holy authors, that there is no
reward or punishment beyond this life”58 and so his bibliography was heavily edited. He
strengthens his argument with a very bold example: “And if by misfortune Atheism should
prevail in Europe and become the doctrine of the most learned•• as there was a time when
Averroism almost prevailed among the philosophers of Italy ••then if missionaries were sent
to Europe by the 60 sages of China and they studied our ancient books, they would have
reason to oppose the wave of opinion of these most learned men and to ridicule their
ridicule.”59. Leibniz here makes it evident that in order for the cultural reciprocity to trigger a
conversion and advancement as society as he knew it, his readers needed to clearly see how
cultures are incredibly open to misinterpretation through being introduced to partial,
prejudicial and/or tainted analysis. Ultimately, Leibniz discredited Longobardi’s attempt at
tying li to the Scholastic’s prime matter, substantial underlying reality of all things, ill fitting.
Consequently Li, should be translated as order and reason.
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Why was Leibniz trying so hard to redesign Christian morals? Why did he care? Was
he doing it all for himself? Cook suggests that Leibniz is aiming to revert back to some
previous version of Christianity:
“He surely cannot mean that Europeans have lost the ability to prove that God exists
or that the soul is immortal; he believed he had himself given a stronger footing than
ever. In saying that natural religion is almost lost, Leibniz must mean something else,
that natural theology has lost the attention of the Europeans, who concentrate instead
on the distractions of sectarian debate. These conflicts and distractions keep our
innate ideas out of our apperception. So Leibniz does not expect the Chinese to teach
Europeans how to reason better or to give them new proofs for the existence of God;
rather, the Chinese would help purify religious discourse in Europe by emphasizing
its essential core.”
Reverting back to previous natural theologies, and not attempting to rationalize and
reformulate what was at hand, and consequently formulating a ‘pure religious discourse’
would’ve been the obvious plan for a thinker such as Leibniz, unlike what Cook suggests. He
did indeed expect the Chinese to rationalize religion: “One sends some Missionaries all the
way to China to preach the Christian religion, and does good, but we need some Missionaries
of Reason in Europe, to preach the Natural Religion, on which Revelation itself is founded, and
without which Revelation would always be taken poorly. The Religion of Reason is eternal,
and God has engraved it in our hearts, our corruptions have obscured it, and the end of JesusChrist has been to render its luster, to restore men to the true knowledge of God and of the
soul, and to make them practice the virtue
makes the true good.”60
Leibniz authored The Monadology, late in his life in 1714, as a summary of his
philosophy. Through this text we can also see why the Chinese understanding of Li and of
natural theology would be entirely coherent to Leibniz, and why in turn his philosophy would
provide a new materialist base for it. In the Monadology, he described incorporeal entities that
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he called Monads. He introduced them as substantial and temporal forms of being, of varying
levels of apperception. Unlike the atoms of Democritus61, Monads are not material things, but
rather principles of change that combine to create different ensembles: a table is a collection of
animate Monads for Leibniz, as is a dog or an institution such as the Catholic Church. The
combination of Monads – which Leibniz came to understand using the principle of calculus he
invented – described functional relations of change that defined and created different forms of
time and space. They are “elements of things”62, he wrote, that “can come into being only by
creation and come to an end only by annihilation”63, and are immune to external changes:
“natural changes of the Monads come from an internal principle,”64. Yet Leibniz held that the
interrelation of all Monads was first established by God’s pre-established harmony. Most
notably, they are all strictly unique: “each Monad must be different from every other. For in
nature there are never two beings which are perfectly alike”65 .
He underlined its resemblance to the concept of the soul, “If we are to give the name
of Soul to everything which has perceptions and desires (...) then all simple substances or
created Monads might be called souls”66 but he clearly states that “the soul is something more
than a bare Monad.”67. He differentiates the two by stating that souls are tied to memory, and
thereby cannot exist without consciousness (both animal and human). For him, Monads are a
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lot more complicated and immaterial notions that have three stages, each stage gradually
getting closer to perfection. It is also important to remark that these Monads “express the
whole universe”68, much as a anamorphic mirror (like a mirrored ball) reflects a room. They
are moreover infinitely dense: “Each portion of matter may be conceived as like a garden full
of plants and like a pond full of fishes. But each branch of every plant, each member of every
animal, each drop of its liquid parts is also some such garden or pond”69 They are “always in a
perpetual flux like rivers”70 and are thus able to be involved in multiple Monadic constructs,
whilst remaining in a unique state within its own boundaries. These metaphysical, incorporeal
structures aided him in getting a grasp of the natural world, and beyond, and allowed for a
new science based on change, forces, and relations rather than static elements in mechanical
relation.
Monadic constructions significantly drove him to make sense of the complexity which
was the Chinese natural philosophy, and arguably their natural theology. The whole universe
was a monadic construction, and at its core was God as the monad-in-chief. But this God was
also a living reflection of this ensemble: it was, from one perspective, li. Once Leibniz saw the
words li and qi(or ki), his interest in the matters of Chinese theology peaked as they appeared
to him to be harmonious with Monadic thought and an essence that complicated
conceptualizing all Chinese thought as atheistic. So his quest to promote the Chinese people as
a group which could possibly be proven spiritually worthy enough to be converted to
Christianity commenced – a translation and conversion which would, of course, substantially
endorse the value of his novel philosophy.
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It can be argued that the best pairings are made possible by a selecting candidates based
on the polarity of each other's respective strengths. Leibniz would’ve been a firm believer of this
argument, given that his conviction that the Euro-Chinese alliance would prove to be an
excellent idea rested on the differences of the two very large powers: “[n]ow the Chinese
Empire, which challenges Europe in cultivated area and certainly surpasses her in population,
vies with us in many other ways in almost equal combat, so that now they win, now we”.
Through divine harmony, the two systems had developed separate and roughly equivalent views
of the universe; it was to Leibniz’ age now possible to bring them into dialog to create a new
definition of a monotheistic natural theology. This was very convenient for Leibniz, as this is the
foundation of the whole project. If China had been more advanced than Europe, even the fact
that they were so spread out from each other wouldn’t have saved them from a possible
triggering of some sort of physical or intellectual war. And if the Europeans were too advanced
for this alliance to take place, they would have just attempted to colonize areas they deemed
prosperous.
It is important to note that while Leibniz is praising their reasoning of “despis[ing]
everything which creates or nourishes ferocity in men,” which he provides as background to the
lack of European militaristic technology and sophistication, he remarked that “[t]hey would be
wise indeed if they were alone in the world[,] [b]ut as things are, it comes back to this, that even
the good much cultivate the arts of war, so that the evil may not gain power over everything.”71
Leibniz does not suggest demilitarizing Europe, or trying to somehow halt European aggression
and hostility, but he does greatly admire Chinese civil behaviour. I am not quite sure he
completely understood his beloved Ricci’s observations on the harshness of Chinese
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punishments and the very strict law enforcement across its many territories, that he wrote down
in his journals, yet he praises them quite freely, time and again: “ Indeed, it is difficult to
describe how beautifully all the laws of the Chinese, in contrast to those of other peoples, are
directed to the achievement of public tranquility and the establishment of social order, so that
men shall be disrupted in their relations as little as possible[;] [c]ertainly by their own doing men
suffer the greatest evils and in turn inflict them upon each other.”72 It is unclear whether or not
Leibniz expected European governments to claim all authority regarding the enforcement of civil
law in public. Thinking of the Chinese maintaining of public lawfulness, it must be said that the
self-proclaimed problem solver Leibniz left a few crucial subjects up in the air.
If the Chinese weren’t religious and expected government officials to maintain highly
ethical behaviour in public, and this system was to be practiced in Europe, how would this affect
the Church’s standing and authority? Surely, the ethical pillars or crutches that were the reason
why Western Civilization was still standing would take a massive blow if Chinese ways of
preserving moral standards were to migrate to Europe. The most important question here is:
would this, as a result, delegitimize Christianity’s, almost monopolized, authority on ethical
standards? Where would it stand and how would these ideas be received? Leibniz unintentionally
stated that Christianity can’t guide the public to be upstanding citizens and he aimed to bring
back what ancient Chinese doctrine or what the friars would call atheism to Europe to save all of
their souls? What about all of the different sects? Leibniz was raised as a Protestant, and was
therefore conditioned to accept potential constructive amendments to be made on his religion.
However, as the Catholics had never been as accepting, would Catholic Europe welcome a
completely foreign culture into its midst, and let it dictate what changes must be made on their
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faith? As Leibniz would agree, an outsider’s perspective and criticism can benefit the host
society in many ways, from potential constructive alterations to gaining information on how the
host society is perceived by the outside world. On the other hand, as most would agree, it is hard
to take criticism in the first place: even if all of Europe was made up of reformist Protestants, it
would’ve been highly unlikely for people to just let go of the system they were born into,
especially if this renovation wasn’t being carried out by the public in a bottom-up revolutionary
fashion. Yet if the value of Chinese natural theology could be demonstrated it might form a
common foundation for the various Christian confessions – much as Leibniz had hoped his own
philosophy could, but now through the revealed wisdom of one of God’s creations: China.
Leibniz was working as an intellectual, trying to solve Europe’s morality crisis. As crime
and quotidian hostility was seemingly too high for Leibniz’s liking, he started searching high and
low for a way to save his beloved continent from unethical behavior, and most importantly: from
the very distracting sect rivalries. From the texts he was exposed to thanks to his correspondents,
he managed to envision what he truly wanted for his friends, neighbors, fellow countrymen, and
his beloved Europeans: “[s]o great is obedience toward superiors and reverence toward elders, so
religious, almost, is the relation of children toward parents, that for children to contrive anything
violent against their parents, even by word, is almost unheard of.”73 The way Leibniz thought he
could best bring in this Chinese public peace, was through Christianity. Though his writings
suggest that he was religious, and he thought that this whole project would deepen his
understanding of God and natural theology, it is clear that his primary motive was to simply end
religious hostility. The most valuable end product belonging to this plan would’ve been the
reformed Euro-Chinese form of Christianity. It had the potential of halting all that was
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distracting Europe from achieving greatness and becoming a true civilization: a most advanced
and complex society.
Leibniz knew how important it was for the Chinese court to access European advanced
sciences and other teachings. However, Leibniz was not running a charity. He had a very clear
goal for which he would never compromise, and so he thought that he could reach his objective
at the cost of trading European intellectual commodities:
“[M]athematicians from the Academie des Sciences have been sent to the Orient to teach
the monarch, not only the mathematical arts, but also the essence of our philosophy [...]
But it is desirable that they in turn teach us those things which are especially in our
interest: the greatest use of practical philosophy and a more perfect manner of living, to
say nothing now of their other arts. Certainly the condition of our affairs, slipping as we
are into ever greater corruption, seems to be such that we need missionaries from the
Chinese who might teach us the use and practice of natural religion, just as we have sent
them teachers of revealed theology.”74
This passage reveals two important parts of his plan, the first being the reciprocity of knowledge
exchange expected from the Chinese, in view of their dominance over Europeans in the realm of
practical philosophies and social morality, and the second being the call for missionaries from
China to travel to Europe with the hopes of them teaching Europeans how to apply natural
theology to their lives. The latter is a great act of submission, as Europeans were the original
missionaries, they were mostly Christian learned men travelling abroad to enlighten the world.
Now with this cultural exchange program, they were supposed to find themselves in requirement
of and hospitably accept foreign missionaries to teach them what had been a known challenge for
the continent, for centuries. This change of tide in the exchange of necessary information that
one nation possessed and the other did not, could have acted as a threat to the faith Europeans
had in their self-declared supremacy over the rest of the world.
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Even if religious hostility and ethical problems were suffocating the people from within
the borders of the Western world, for Leibniz, Europe’s gift of Christianity was able to redeem
the continents name and restore its prestige : “And so I believe that if someone expert, not in the
beauty of goddesses but in the excellence of peoples, were selected as judge, the golden apple
would be awarded to the Chinese unless we should win by virtue of one great but superhuman
thing, namely, the divine gift of the Christian religion.”75 This was Leibniz’s way to show his
readers however dire the morality issues might have been, Europe could always surpass China,
as long as it held on to its faith, Christianity. Yet, if China were to accept Christianity and
embrace it the way Europe eventually did, could Europe still contest for the golden apple?

75

Ibid., 51.

44

Chapter 3
Leibniz’s City of God

For Leibniz, as we have seen, Chinese doctrine was far too important and underutilized to
be considered a heresy that was to be discarded of or burnt away. China existed for a greater
reason: God had made China and its teachings accessible to Leibniz in order for him to get the
chance to fulfill his foundational goal of reaching the closest degree perfection man was
permitted access to. China permitted Leibniz to observe a state where natural theology is the
most dominant philosophical system. China and its naturally revealed religion, therefore, had an
important place, as it played the role of a necessary counterpart to Europe.
The basis of Leibniz’ higher order synthesis merged Europe’s monotheism and advanced
analytical skill with China’s naturally revealed theology, a phenomenon which was inspired by
the functions of Leibniz’s Monadology, for if simple substances could formulate compounds in
order to fulfill the calling or requirement of a higher purpose or meaning, these material states
could formulate a compound themselves. Molding such a complex structure wouldn’t take away
from the essential independence the founding Monads or states possessed in their respective
cores, but it would correct the underutilization or inefficiency of the subjects. This way, Leibniz
properly allocated the perfect strengths and skills of the individual Monad or society, and
proposed a complex but refined and tailored end product. God is defined by Leibniz as the
perspective on all monadic combinations and defines a great civilization as similarly providing
an overview of a vast, but lesser, realm of these combinations, perhaps as embodied by an
emperor but also as an ideal construct as “the empire.” Two combine the perspectives of the two
greatest known civilizations in the world would for Leibniz necessarily be both a political and
theological event of the immense magnitude.
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Leibniz trusted the ancient philosophies and the alleged natural theologies of the Chinese
and considered them closer to the foundation of Chinese thought and far superior to their modern
thinkers: “[n]ow this shows also that the ancient Chinese have surpassed the modern ones in the
extreme, not only in piety (which is the basis of the most perfect morality) but in science as
well.”76 The accommodationists’ interpretations of the ancient texts, free from associations with
Buddhist, Taoist and atheistic concepts allowed Leibniz and other accommodationists to view
them as belonging to the realm of natural theology. This is highlighted in the passages where
Leibniz criticized Father Longobardi for being too dependent on the interpretations and
commentary of Mandarin atheistic thinkers, for Leibniz this made Longobardi’s source for
information quite tainted, and thereby his ideas on Chinese philosophy equally unreliable.77
One of the prime examples that worked in favor of Leibniz’s assumed superiority of
European analytics and its products is of the Binary Arithmetic:
“Reverend Father Bouvet and I have discovered the meaning, apparently truest to the
text, of the characters of Fohi, founder of Empire, which consist simply of combinations
of unbroken and broken lines, and which pass for the most ancient writing of China in its
simplest form. … Actually, the 64 figures represent a Binary Arithmetic which
apparently this great legislator [Fu Xi] possessed, and which I have rediscovered some
thousands of years later.”78
Leibniz, today, is known to be the father of the Binary code, mentioned in Chapter 1 in the
context of Leibniz’s use of the book of I Ching. Here in this passage he defends Chinese thought,
to the extent of the simple but effective arithmetic that was, according to him misinterpreted for
quite some time. Leibniz argued that before his European perspective landed on the books, many
thinkers tried to apply different uses for the teachings, “Fohi, the Emperor Ven Vam and his son
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Cheu Cum, and Confucius more than five centuries later, have all sought therein philosophical
mysteries.”79 Yet, none of them saw the most suitable application of the arithmetic, but Leibniz
and Father Bouvet, a French Jesuit missionary who spent time in China, did. This is an import
remark, considering that it added to the case of the delegitimization of modern Chinese thought
and the idea that these ancient Chinese books might have been hiding lucrative ideas that could
only be mined using European tools.
The religious situation in China, during Ricci’s time, was an interesting one, the
increased commercialization and urbanization allowed for many religions to be practiced:
synagogues, Taoist temples, Buddhist temples, Tibetan Buddhist temples, mosques welcomed its
followers, this was made possible by the dominant state ideology, Confucianism, and its claim of
superiority.80
The reason why Matteo Ricci thought that the Chinese public’s ancient theologies could
potentially welcome the guidance of an overarching religion, like Christianity, rested on how
China carried itself all the way to his own century:
“Of all the Pagan sects known to Europe, I know of no people who fell into fewer errors
in the early ages of their antiquity than did the Chinese. From the very beginning of their
history, it is recorded in their writings that they recognized and worshipped one Supreme
Being whom they called the King of Heaven, or designated by some other name
indicating his rule over heaven and earth.”81
He was thoroughly impressed by the way Confucian principles had managed to guide most of the
population without having a religious presence comparable to one derived from a monotheistic
moral guidance system. Having no real claim on the events in the afterlife, convinced Ricci and
other accommodationists that appropriating any anti-Christian themes to their ancient texts was
79
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not respectful of their doctrines. Ricci not only established the Jesuit mission in China, but he
also established the image of a religious European of an Abrahamic religion. Ricci’s respect for
Chinese natural theology benefitted his image, and therefore his conversion mission. He tried to
leave as much Chinese culture intact, in a similar way to how Pagan beliefs were once preserved
in its followers great conversion to Christianity, some centuries ago.82
Ricci noted that the Chinese were easy potential converts: “[they] could certainly become
Christians, since the essence of their doctrine contains nothing the contrary to the essence of the
Catholic faith nor would the Catholic faith hinder them in any way, but would indeed air in that
attainment of the quiet and peace of the republic which their books claim as their goal.” 83 Well
then, why didn’t they convert to Christianity? Why did the mission fail? Ricci tried to maintain a
high regard for himself and his cause where he was perceived as a foreigner selling religion
where it wasn’t needed. From changing his attire to his class, to making the effort of becoming
more than fluent in the Chinese language, he battled long and hard in order to preserve Chinese
cultural identity and its almost sacred doctrines whilst promoting the true word of the lord. This
wasn’t what all missionaries did, especially since the mission eventually was terminated due to
the Rites controversy, and the hostility that arose out of the situation.
Confucian doctrine was widespread and its concepts were made accessible to the public,
however Leibniz suggested that there was more to be understood from the teachings. Leibniz
claimed that Chinese thought far exceeded the depth of much European thought, and if this were
true for modern thought it was even truer of ancient thought. Therefore the European analytical
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method of critical reading was needed in order for these texts’ true meanings to be revealed
properly:
“It is indeed apparent that if we Europeans were well enough informed concerning
Chinese Literature, then, with the aid of logic, critical thinking, mathematics and our
manner of expressing thought more exacting than theirs--we could uncover in the
Chinese writings of the remotest antiquity many things unknown to modern Chinese and
even to other commentators thought to be classical.”84
This was argued in order to establish Longobardi’s failure to differentiate good sources for
interpretations and information, as it so clearly suggests that European contemporary analytics
were so superior to the Chinese’s that their modern writings couldn’t be trusted the same way as
European documents.
The relationship between Leibniz himself and God is itself an important one. Based off of
his writings on religion and the Monadology, one would argue that he did believe in one allpowerful God, and even went as far as to plot ways to strengthen his understanding of God
through harmony and the graduation on to a higher level of society. Leibniz set out to
accomplish this dream of further proving God’s existence through reverting to simpler and more
natural theological concepts. Leibniz greatly admired the word simple, and the concept of going
back to simplified versions of events or theories in order to rebuild the subject anew, in an
attempt to avoid the problems that once caused impasses. This chapter will address Leibniz’s
God, the relationship between God, li and Monads as well as Leibniz’s vision for the future and
his underlying motivations that lead to his advocacy of the great Euro-Chinese exchange one last
time before his death. Whereas we have address the basis in European problems for Leibniz’
quest, and the sources in Chinese thought from which he drew, this chapter will address his own
experience and goals in the creation of his new hybrid kingdom of ideas.
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Leibniz wrote Pierre Bayle, author of the great 18th century Historical and Critical
Dictionary, about his Monads and how he believed they made it possible to prove God, mainly
through a plan which he later in the Monadology described as the City of God. Leibniz, like the
Chinese did for Li, gave God attributes, or rather captioned his domains, with the hopes of being
able to recreate God-like structures with a lot less perfections, which would still be considered
large improvements on the then current ones. Leibniz thought he could only obtain this through
the connections made through simple substances and the harmony that would come from the
bonds. On one hand, he hoped to develop a new logic reaching the foundations of things, so that
he developed various “universal characteristics” or languages through which to describe the
world in the simplest terms. The most basic of these we have described earlier: a binary notation
system. The most complicated was his invention of calculus. Yet on the other hand he proposed
in his Theodicy that all monads form the “most perfect” possible combination, so that it was
possible to always find an explanation for any state of affairs. It was this latter concept that
Leibniz took as both a hypothesis about the world and one which, once entered, formed a new
sort of proof for God:
“Besides, no hypothesis but this (which I venture to call proved) fittingly exalts the
greatness of God; and this Monsieur Bayle recognized when, in his Dictionary (article
Rorarius), he raised objections to it, in which indeed he was inclined to think that I was
attributing too much to God- more than it is possible to attribute. But he was unable to
give any reason which could show the impossibility of this universal harmony, according
to which every substance exactly expresses all others through the relations it has with
them.”85
Attributing too much to God, was for Leibniz the entire point of his theodicy: it was a belief that
than revealed a proper approach to knowledge and belief.
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Leibniz’s willingness not to give up on the Chinese case, even after the Vatican’s
finalized decision regarding Chinese doctrine in the beginning of the eighteenth century shut off
his conduit of information from the region, is probably largely due to the fact that Leibniz
believed that God chose this very universe for it showed the greatest potential. This universe, to
him, was worth working on because of the impossibility of God putting faith or effort into the
wrong universe: “[n]ow, as in the Ideas of God there is an infinite number of possible universes,
and as only one of them can be actual there must be a sufficient reason for the choice of God,
which leads Him to decide upon one rather than another.”86 The reason he gives for this sounds
quite logical for how absurd and abstract it really is: “[a]nd this reason can be found only in the
fitness, or in the degrees of perfection, that these worlds possess, since each possible thing has
the right to aspire to existence in proportion to the amount of perfection it contains in germ.”87
The idea of the fitness of the entire universe to be measured by the level of perfection found in a
germ is certainly far out there, even by Leibniz’s standards, but it does grant him the permission
to trust his God and fellow man in a very interesting manner. Leibniz’s God and his best universe
scenario only works through an understanding of both parties appreciation for it being the best of
circumstances, which is a very comforting thought for all involved parties. And on another note,
this idea can be seen in everything Leibniz touches, as the efforts he makes, especially the ones
underlining God’s virtue and creating better societies as he thought that improvements must be
made in order for our world to reach the highest state and a new level of closeness to God. After
all, “the actual existence of the best that wisdom makes known to God is due to this, that His
goodness makes Him choose it, and His power makes Him produce it”88 therefore it would be
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more than wasteful to not try to complete God’s work and regroup on a religious path to the
formation of great societies.
The degrees of perfection Leibniz mentions rest on God’s power, knowledge and will.
This concept is difficult to grasp at first due to its oxymoronic wording, but it is primarily
associated with his classification of Monads and therefore does not make bold claims regarding
perfection and its inner variety in a literal manner. To understand Leibniz’ argument we have to
digress slightly to define what he understands monads to be, and how he would understand their
complex interrelations to define most things, ideas, activities, and institutions. On the simplest
level, this focus on monads allows us to understand why Leibniz’ approach to Chinese belief
would be so sympathetic. The fact that Monads were simple substances, thought up to be
naturally indivisible make it possible for them to be independent:
“[t]hese characteristics [(God’s power, will and knowledge)] correspond to what in the
created Monads forms the ground of basis, to the faculty of Perception and to the faculty
of Appetition. But in God these attributes are absolutely infinite or perfect; and in the
created Monads … there are only imitations of these attributes, according to the degree of
perfection of the Monad.”89
Appetition and perception in the realm of Monads represent the shift from one perception to
another caused by their internal principle and the passing condition which shows multiplicity in
the simple substance, respectively.90 It is important to distinguish the Monads’ self-sufficiency
which allow themselves to govern their internal activities. This will be the crucial point in
understanding how the Monad’s compound complex structures in turn will exemplify how
humans would ideally reorganize themselves, in order to reach a higher level of enlightenment.
It must be noted however, that as Monads are capable of limited self-governing, within
the constraints of their internal principals, they are unable to influence the inner principles of one
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another and thereby are dependent of compound structures, which are collections of simple
substances. The relationship between Monads could have derived from human connections: “in
simple substances the influence of one Monad upon another is only ideal, and it can have its
effect only through the mediation of God, in so far as in the ideas of God any Monad rightly
claims that God in regulating the others from the beginning of things, should have regard to it.”91
Leibniz often seeked backing from elements he would gather from his relationship with God, in
attempts to ground his thoughts, and have an established and constant reference point
This simple reference and the improvements he makes on the initial idea highlights
Leibniz’s eagerness to revert back to more natural, and less contemporary or, as he described
them, “modern” thoughts which he considered tainted due to religious rivalry, overall distance
from natural theology and other contemporary issues. In order to perform this task, Leibniz
needed another dose of natural theology. What he eventually found in China permitted him to
reassure God’s position in the world, especially as prime law-giver and utilizer.
Leibniz’s conviction was that this was the right universe to be chosen by God as it
showed the most potential, and this fit with God’s master craftsmanship and choice of the best
fitting laws. In a way, his Monadology worked as means to convince himself first and the world
second, that unity through harmony was the key to figuring out what was truly best for humanity.
Even as universal harmony was a hypothesis, it was one that revealed both God’s complexity and
a means of investigating any problem for its next deeper level of meaning. Entering into this
circle demonstrated the power of Leibniz’s real order, and he thought that the Chinese had
become better at perceiving that order. It was his firm belief that if European and Christian
traditions of thinking were to be applied to their doctrines, their work would become more
meaningful and worthy of mass distribution, especially if used as a device to refresh the essence
91
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of God’s words, and reform Christianity. This was his goal, and his foundation is this being the
most perfect world, and thus worthy of collaborative efforts and constructive dialogue between
two great realms, Christian European and Chinese.
The Monads simplicity, essence to be without parts, should be considered a model for
human mind and spirit. Leibniz chose time and again, to reintroduce the subject of his essays in
simpler form, with the aims of clarifying the core of the problem he desired to address and solve.
In a letter to Nicolas Malebranche, a French Oratory priest and a rational philosopher,
Leibniz explained how he viewed God’s way of thinking and emphasized the importance of
simplicity: “God makes the most things he can and what obliges him to seek simple laws is the
need to find a place for as many things as can be put together; if he made use of other laws, it
would be like trying to make a building with round stones, which make us lose more space than
they occupy.”92 Leibniz viewed the great architect as an entity that would respect the simplest
ways to create and design its products made possible by its elementary foundations. He had high
regard for what he thought was simple in its nature.
According to Leibniz there are important distinctions to be made between souls in
Monads, and they must be explained before entering the realm of souls, Li and whether or not
souls were indeed a part of ancient Chinese theology, from the perspective and context of
European theology. Leibniz finalized his thoughts about his Monadic structures well after
encountering Li and other Chinese philosophical concepts, thus making his formulations of the
differences between (his interpretation of)Li, Monads and souls quite deliberate. Leibniz, in his
Monadology, drew a clean border between Monads and souls:
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“If we are to give the name of Soul to everything which has perceptions and appetites in
the general sense which I have explained, then all simple substances or created Monads
might be called souls; but as feeling is something more than a bare perception, I think it
right that the general name of Monads...should suffice for simple substances which have
perception only, and that the name of Souls should be given only to those in which
perception is more distinct, and is accompanied by memory.”93
For Leibniz, we can conclude that he considers memory to be a deciding factor when
contemplating the level of consciousness for his subject. He attributes appetites and perceptions
to souls as well, which derives from the assumption that soul possessors have a degree of selfsufficiency.
Leibniz planned out the differences between souls and Monads quite well, as before the
Monadology’s release, he had time to revise his framework and approach anew his innovative
and complex subject. The details and parameters on memory and how it formulates the
difference between souls and Monads lies here:
“For we experience in ourselves a condition in which we remember nothing and have no
distinguishable perception; as when we fall into a swoon or when we are overcome with a
profound dreamless sleep. In this state the soul does not perceptibly differ from a bare Monad;
but as this state is not lasting, and the soul comes out of it, the soul is something more than a bare
Monad.”94
It is unclear whether or not Leibniz would state the following openly, as an argument on
its own, but it is clearly implied in the text above; souls are not simple substances. The fact that it
could be composed of a Monad or more, due to his rule stating that a soul is more than a bare
Monad, eliminates another possible way in which the two could have been equals: in their
immaterial skeletal structure.

93
94

Leibniz, Monadology. As cited in Latta, 230.
Ibid., 230.

55

Monads are non-spatial quite like souls, therefore one must interpret the closeness
between Monads as a closeness between the bodies of the corresponding Monads.95 This is an
important distinction to make, in order to preserve the inner principle’s independence from
external natural factors.
Leibniz’s concept of a soul requires it to have parts which aren’t exclusive to the
possessor of the soul, thereby there isn’t a portion that remains unique to the possessor: “all
bodies are in a perpetual flux like rivers, and parts are entering into them and passing out of them
continually.”96 This recycling of parts of the soul isn’t immune to death, “there never is absolute
birth [generation] nor complete death, in the strict sense, consisting in the separation of the soul
from the body [,] [w]hat we call births [generations] are developments and growths, while what
we call deaths are envelopments and diminutions.”97
The flow of the soul’s parts that re-enter the system after an individual’s death, to be
redefined by its new possessor acts as a bridge between Leibniz’s philosophy and Chinese
alleged ancient spirituality. In the Discourse, Leibniz puts his pen, and noodle, to work one last
time for one last fight in his advocacy for Chinese natural theology to be accepted, and for their
spirituality to be observed, at the very least:
“His fifth objection [(Father Longobardi’s fifth objection as to why he argued li was
simply formless prime matter of the Scholastics’)] is also based on a false or mistaken
supposition: namely, that according to the Chinese all things of the world are necessarily
material and that there is nothing truly spiritual…. But I believe (as I have already said)
that the Chinese recognize no distinct immaterial substance other than the Li which has
produced Matter. In this I believe they are correct and that the order of things brings it
about that all individual Spirits are always united to bodies and that the soul, even after
death, is never stripped of all organized matter or of all informed air.”98
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This very clear statement shows Leibniz’s matured perception of Chinese philosophy, especially
since he mentioned going through passages he found from Chinese classical authors. It is also
made possible through the findings and notions he utilized for the Monadology. Prior to
clarifying his simple substances in the 90 paragraphs of this book, he had mentioned spirituality
in a less broad context in his previous correspondences, arguing in favor of the Chinese theology.
The Monadology permitted him to see li in a different light, which is the main reason why it is
such a dominant theme in the Discourse. One could possibly argue that had he started working
on clarifying his Monads to his readers beforehand, and also had gathered more on Chinese
theology earlier, he might have been able to reach a larger audience and perhaps saved Chinese
souls and thereby their Rites.
Leibniz’s prime motivation in the quest of mending European ethics and reforming
Christianity, in order to settle the current and prevent future sect disputes, was revolved around
his “City of God”. This plan for an advanced civilization first emerged at the end of the
Monadology, but it can be observed in his plans for his Euro-Chinese dream. As it stands as the
model for the ideal realm in which peace and piety come together to host a serene and virtuous
environment that as a result reflects the might of God. Leibniz was certain that such a high
achievement would prove the existence of God, as it could only be made possible through God
as a creator and an architect, and that religion was the key that opened the door to mundane
theological paradise.
Leibniz thought that a person’s will is given by the creator of all, his God, and that God
itself possessed a secret will which lead many wise and virtuous people to sync with it and
devote their energies to the cause. He believed that only by God’s pure love could people
recognize the order of the universe and through God, find happiness:
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“Finally, under this perfect government no good action would be unrewarded and no bad
one unpunished, and all should issue in the well-being of the good, that is to say, of those
who are not malcontents in this great state, but who trust in Providence, after having done
their duty, and who love and imitate, as is meet, the Author of all good, finding pleasure
in the contemplation of His perfections, as is the way of genuine ‘pure love,’ which takes
pleasure in the happiness of the beloved.”99
The City of God would function as a tool to get closer to the only thing which does not possess a
body, by his definition: God. The passion he had for fighting for Chinese natural theology was
fueled by the idea that it was possible to architect and engineer this city. For he genuinely
believed that ancient and simple examples could add so much more to the divine debates.
Leibniz also implied, in this passage, that the city could function properly only if governed by
Providence, which would eventually have led people to find happiness and pure love, through
religion.
He figured that if people could read these millennia old texts, they could deduce that
God, in Leibniz’ definition, was observed and noted in a land where Jesus could not have
traversed and see, for themselves, how even these people so far from Christianity knew the
power, knowledge, and grace of his God. In his Discourse he attempted to correct translations
mentioning li in the context of more than just supreme order and its five virtues: piety, justice,
religion, prudence, and faith.100 He even went as far as to theorize that it is possible for them to
have misworded some of their theories, and that it is possible to interpret that they got close to
Leibniz’s causation principles on their own:
“They say of Heaven what we say of the beasts, namely that they act according to
intelligence and as if they possessed it, although they do not possess it at all because they
are directed by the supreme order of reason; which the Chinese call Li. When they say
that the primal air or matter leaves the Li naturally and involuntarily, it could be they
believe that God has created matter necessarily. But one could grant yet a better meaning
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to their words, explaining them more fittingly: namely, that supreme Reason has been
brought to that which is the most rational. It is possible they call the Li necessary,
because it is determined and infallible; misusing the term "necessary" as many Europeans
do.”101
He further commended them, stating that they should be considered far from blameworthy for
the conclusions they were able to come through, especially without the guidance offered to the
people of Abrahamic religions and not to them.
Spirits give God power, and if people were to gather in a morally sound and scientifically
advanced society, this could only further highlight God’s goodness, wisdom and power. This
solution he approved of, the merging of Europe and China in reformation of Christianity could
have only further empowered God, and proved how good both he and his creations are as
expressed by their new advanced society. Leibniz here completely credited his deity in the face
of humanity’s triumph in creating the perfect state, governed by the faith in the perfect
incorporeal being. This city of God, would have been a man-made city, cultivated from what we
can adlib as the great cultural exchange, and the reverting back to natural theology, moving away
from Europe’s diverse sects and the troubles they brought on. Leibniz here presented his
fascination with God, and expresses this mystical way of how God’s city was the answer to both
what should be in store for the next superior civilization, and how man could get closer to God
from the experience, as a whole. This part of the Monadology rested on the shoulders of a
Leibniz who thought he could prove his God’s might through working to create the perfect
society for what he thought was the universe God favors. Essentially, Leibniz’s great plan to
convert China to Christianity and reform the religion based off of ancient Chinese natural
philosophy and theology, and thus create the perfectly ethical and enlightened society primarily
aimed to create a plan to prove God’s might.
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After Leibniz’s Discourse and other later attempts to argue in favor of the great cultural
exchange, Pope Clement XI’s 1704 anti-accommodationist decree was made public in China in
1707 and in 1709 in Europe, thus widening the gap between the continents on a spiritual level.
This decision to refuse Chinese natural theology did not change in Catholicism until the end of
the first half of the twentieth century. In 1724, most missionaries were forced to leave, and only
the ones the court deemed useful remained to teach astronomy, thus concluding the abandonment
of the plans that once held high expectations as an end product of a mutually spiritually
rewarding partnership.
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Conclusion

Leibniz had faith in his own capacity to provide the best of all possible worlds, the one
which he got to call home, with an efficient plan that in turn highlighted the perfections of God,
as well as aligned with the optimistic projections of human potential God had entrusted humanity
with. Leibniz’s plan was focused on demonstrating his deity’s excellence, by creating an
environment that was morally superior and therefore deserving of even more from God:
“This City of God, this truly universal monarchy, is a moral world in the natural world,
and is the most exalted and most divine among the works of God; and it is in it that the
glory of God really consists, for He would have no glory were not His greatness and His
goodness known and admired by spirits [esprits]. It is also in relation to this divine City
that God specially has goodness, while His wisdom and His power are manifested
everywhere.”102
If goodness could function as revealed knowledge, it would appear as if Leibniz’s rational
theology could suffice to unlock it. Yet, in order to access rational theology, much of the dogma
that had been weighing on all attempts at reforming Christianity had to be shed off.
It could only have been after understanding the importance of European knowledge in
China, and how easily commodifiable mathematics, Western philosophy and other studies truly
were that Leibniz turned to China in order for it to participate in his cultural exchange model. In
1607, Father Matteo Ricci translated Euclid’s Elements of Geometry and thus made it available
to Chinese military officers, farmers, workers, statesmen and pretty much anyone who would
become interested in learning about this subject that was so vital and readily attainable in
Europe.103
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Europe had a lot more knowledge to offer than a book on geometry, mostly prepared
before Jesus was just a thought in heaven, as my mother would put it. After all, it was the birthcontinent of the university. Leibniz was very much aware of this, as he repeatedly emphasized
how the Chinese lacked not only Christian revealed knowledge, but standard European doctrine.
It was in the interests of both continents for this merger to have worked out, however it was
primarily Leibniz’s dream and not the vision of the respective authorities of the two societies.
Had the collective monarchs been on board, our world today could have been incredibly
different: “[w]hence it is easy to conclude that the totality of all spirits must compose the City of
God, that is to say, the most perfect State that is possible, under the most perfect of
Monarchs.”104 His utopian state may never have seen the light of day, but at least he tried, which
in turn makes a world of difference.
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